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Background
 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in the National 
Airspace System (NAS): 
 Demand has skyrocketed for routine access to the NAS
 Military, scientific, national security and emergency management 
applications have all called for easier admittance
 Currently required to obtain Certificate of Authorization 
(COA), a time consuming, restrictive process
 Also requires air traffic controllers (ATC) to block airspace, which 
can reduce airspace efficiency
Background
 Barriers to Integration: 
 Lack of agreed upon minimum performance standards
 A chief concern is contingency management
 How will UAS deal with emergency events, such as the loss of the 
command and control link (i.e., lost link)?
 How will procedures impact the rest of the system?
 Standardized and predictable contingency 
management procedures are essential to integration
Background
 Current Behaviors: 
 UAS response to contingency events are agreed upon 
within individual COAs with the FAA
 UAS may:
 Return to base
 Continue to destination
 Return to mission altitude
Background
 Purpose of Study: 
 Examine the impact of existing UAS contingency 
management procedures on air traffic control (ATC)
 How do current UAS behaviors impact a controller’s ability to 
maintain a safe and efficient airspace?
 How do the behaviors impact controller’s self-reported 
workload?
 Hypothesis:
 More sudden and/or sizable maneuvers would negatively impact 
ATC performance and workload
 Smaller maneuvers would have less impact on surrounding traffic
 Less immediate maneuvers would provide time for pilot to inform ATC
Method
 Contingency Behavior
 Four current contingency behaviors were modeled in this 
study
 3 behaviors for responding to lost link
 1 behavior for responding to severe loss in oil pressure
 Developed through:
 Review of existing documentation
 MQ-9 flight manual
 Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems CONOPS
 Semi-structured interviews 
 3 current UAS pilots from 2 different platforms
Method
 Contingency Behavior
ID Event Contingency Behavior Time to Execute
C1 N/A N/A N/A
C2 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 1 min
C3 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 8 min
C4 Lost Link Maintain Course (Return to Mission 
Altitude)
1 min
C5 Drop in Oil 
Pressure
Land at Emergency Site (incl. descent of 
maximum 10000ft)
Immediate
Method
 C1: No Contingency Event
14000 MSL
Method
 Contingency Behavior
ID Event Contingency Behavior Time to Execute
C1 N/A N/A N/A
C2 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 1 min
C3 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 8 min
C4 Lost Link Maintain Course (Return to Mission 
Altitude)
1 min
C5 Drop in Oil 
Pressure
Land at Emergency Site (incl. descent of 
maximum 10000ft)
Immediate
Method
 C2: Return to Base in 1 Minute
Loss of Link
14000 MSL
Method
 Contingency Behavior
ID Event Contingency Behavior Time to Execute
C1 N/A N/A N/A
C2 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 1 min
C3 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 8 min
C4 Lost Link Maintain Course (Return to Mission 
Altitude)
1 min
C5 Drop in Oil 
Pressure
Land at Emergency Site (incl. descent of 
maximum 10000ft)
Immediate
Method
 C3: Return to Base in 8 Minutes
Loss of Link
14000 MSL
Method
 Contingency Behavior
ID Event Contingency Behavior Time to Execute
C1 N/A N/A N/A
C2 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 1 min
C3 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 8 min
C4 Lost Link Maintain Course (Return to Mission 
Altitude)
1 min
C5 Drop in Oil 
Pressure
Land at Emergency Site (incl. descent of 
maximum 10000ft)
Immediate
Method
 C4: Maintain Course Return to Mission Alt
Loss of Link
12000 MSL
Begin 
Return to 
14000 MSL
Method
 Contingency Behavior
ID Event Contingency Behavior Time to Execute
C1 N/A N/A N/A
C2 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 1 min
C3 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 8 min
C4 Lost Link Maintain Course (Return to Mission 
Altitude)
1 min
C5 Drop in Oil 
Pressure
Land at Emergency Site (incl. descent of 
maximum 10000ft)
Immediate
Method
 C5: Emergency Landing at KRIV
Oil Pressure Drop
14000 MSL
Begin 
Descent to 
5000 MSL
March Air 
Reserve Base 
(KRIV)
Method
 Contingency Behavior
ID Event Contingency Behavior Time to Execute
C1 N/A N/A N/A
C2 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 1 min
C3 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 8 min
C4 Lost Link Maintain Course (Return to Mission 
Altitude)
1 min
C5 Drop in Oil 
Pressure
Land at Emergency Site (incl. descent of 
maximum 10000ft)
Immediate
• Hypothesize that C3 and C4 will be least impactful on ATC 
performance
• C2 and C5 most impactful
Method
 Experimental Design
 One-Way Repeated Measures Factorial
 Contingency Behavior (5 levels, within subjects)
 Counterbalanced order of presentation within each block across participants
 Block (2 levels; within subjects)
 No systematic difference between levels
 Experimental Scenarios
 2 Blocks
 5 experimental runs per block
 Experimental runs lasted 17 min
 Each trial followed up by workload and general questionnaire
Method
 Participants
 14 Retired Controllers (Male):
 Civilian ATC Experience:
 TRACON – 14/14 (26 years on avg.)
 13/14 had experience working East Feeder
 Tower – 10/14
 Center – 2/14
 Military ATC Experience:
 TRACON – 5/14
 Tower – 4/14
Method
 Apparatus
 Multi Aircraft Control System (MACS) provided controller 
display
 Display System Replacement (DSR) presentation of Southern 
California TRACON [East Feeder/ZLA20]
 Hybrid sector – airspace positively controlled from surface to FL230
 Participants used keyboard and mouse for inputs
Method
 Apparatus
 Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) provided 
simulated UAS ground control station
 Allowed for simulated injection events (e.g., loss link and 
severe oil loss)
 UAS pilot provided  with script when coordinating with ATC 
following contingencies
 MQ1 Predator (Modified)
 Speed: 110 knots
 Mission Alt: 14000 MSL
-Vigilant Spirit Control System, AFRL-
Method
 Apparatus
 Traffic Scenarios
 Designed off of a busy, current day at SoCal TRACON
 Included arrivals into LAX and ONT, as well as overflights (in 
addition to single UAS)
 Manned aircraft were level when entering sector
 Arrivals had to be manually descended by ATC
Method
 Procedure
 Task:
 Maintain safe separation
 3nm and 1000ft (approach airspace separation requirements)
 Ensure LAX arrivals meet appropriate altitude restrictions.
 LAX arrivals required to exit sector @SKOLL at 10000 MSL
 Descent ONT arrivals to 5000 MSL for visual approach
 No coordination with ONT tower
 Manage overflights (including UAS)
 Training
 Trained on MACS software and overall sector operations
 Included brief on UAS characteristics and potential contingencies
 3 practice scenarios (2 with only manned AC, 1 with UAS)
 No practice on UAS contingency behaviors 
Method
 Metrics
 ATC Performance
 Safety
 Number of Losses of 
Separation (violation of 3nm 
and 1000ft)
 Workload
 Handoff Accept Time 
 Time elapsed between 
adjacent sector’s initial 
handoff and experimental 
controller’s acceptance)
 Efficiency
 Avg. time in sector per AC
 Avg. distance flown per AC
 Subjective Ratings
 NASA-Task Load Index 
 Mental Demand, Physical Demand, 
Temporal Demand, Performance 
Degradation, Effort and Frustration
 Post-Trial Questionnaire
 Assessed impact of contingencies on 
controller’s self reported separation 
strategies
 Post-Simulation Questionnaire
 Queried controllers on overall 
simulation fidelity and compared 
across levels of Contingency Behavior
 Analysis
 Data analyzed using a 5 (Contingency Behavior: C1-C5) x 2 (Block: 1-2) 
Repeated Measures ANOVA
Results: ATC Performance
 Safety
– No significant main effect of Contingency Behavior on 
Number of LOS (p>.05)
• LOS were low across all levels of Contingency Behavior
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)
C4 Maintain course (return to alt)
C5 Emergency landing
Results: ATC Performance
 Workload
– No significant main effect of Contingency Behavior on 
number of handoff accept time (p>.05)
• Handoff accept times were low and stable across conditions
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)
C4 Maintain course (return to alt)
C5 Emergency landing
Results: ATC Performance
 Efficiency
– No significant main effect of Contingency Behavior on 
Distance Through Sector (p>.05)
• Controllers remarkably consistent between conditions
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)
C4 Maintain course (return to alt)
C5 Emergency landing
Results: ATC Performance
 Efficiency
– No significant main effect of Contingency Behavior on Time 
Through Sector (p>.05)
• Controllers consistent across conditions
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)
C4 Maintain course (return to alt)
C5 Emergency landing
Results: Subjective Ratings
 NASA-TLX
– No significant main effect of Contingency Behavior on any 
of controller’s self-reported workload scales (p’s>.05)
• Mental, Physical and Effort demands slightly above average
• Temporal, Frustration and Performance demands slightly below
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)
C4 Maintain course (return to alt)
C5 Emergency landing
Contingency 
Behavior
High
Low
Results: Subjective Ratings
 Post-Trial Questionnaire
– No significant effect on any of the 8 questions (p’s>.05)
• Rating: 0 (Strongly Disagree) – 5 (Strongly Agree)
– Questions included:
• Impact on ability to safely/efficiently manage sector
• Impact on situation 
awareness
• Predictability of 
behavior
• Buffer size for UAS
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)
C4 Maintain course (return to alt)
C5 Emergency landing
Contingency 
Behavior
Results: Subjective Ratings
 Post-Simulation Questionnaire
– Controller’s were asked their preferred contingency 
behavior (from Most Impactful to Least Impactful) in terms 
of:
• Safety
• Efficiency
• Workload
– For all 3 questions controllers responded:
• C4 (Return to Mission Alt/Maintain Pre-Programmed Course)
• C3 (Return to Base in 8min)
• C2 (Return to Base in 1min)
• C1 (Emergency Landing)
Conclusion
 Study suggests:
– Contrary to hypothesis, current contingencies found to 
have no positive or negative effects on controller 
performance or subjective reports
– No differences between contingencies or relative to 
baseline condition (with no contingency event)
• Losses of separation, handoff accept times, time and distance 
through sector saw no significant effects
• Workload, post trial and post simulation questionnaires also failed 
to see effects
– However, when asked, controllers found the Return to 
Altitude/Maintain Course & the 8 minute Return to Base 
contingencies to be the least impactful
• Emergency landing contingency was rated as most impactful
Conclusion
 Explanation of findings
– Controllers commented that dealing with a single UAS 
(even when operating under a variety of contingency 
procedures) was not problematic
• Nearly all controllers noted that they frequently dealt with 
“special” AC while working ZLA20 (East Feeder)
– DEA and FBI routinely flew helicopters or fixed-wing AC at low 
altitudes with unpredictable routing
• Participants had worked East Feeder, likely very motivated/talented 
controllers
– Suggests controllers’ skill sets were robust enough to 
accommodate a single, unpredictable, slow-moving AC
– FAA likely designs contingency procedures that are 
intentionally minimally impactful
Conclusion
 Limitations:
– No “true” baseline scenario – i.e., trial without UAS present
• May have obscured comparisons
– Looked only at approach airspace that was relatively 
conflict free
• Used a hybrid sector (part approach, part center) with traffic that 
was flying level
• Class A (no VFR included in scenario)
Conclusion
 Recommendations for Future Research:
– Present the contingencies within more difficult contexts
• Higher density traffic
• Different airspace (e.g., Class E or D)
• Script complex conflictions with the UA
– Simulate different types of contingencies
• Context-sensitive contingencies
– UAS behavior is dictated by the current airspace or operation
• Design purposefully disruptive contingencies to demonstrate 
sensitivity of our metrics
– May make it easier to accept null hypothesis
– NORTHCOMM is currently testing impact of contingency 
operations in flight test conditions
 Questions?
Conclusion
